Capture the Flag (CTF) competitions are educational and professional tools for the cybersecurity community. Unfortunately, CTF platforms suffer from the same security issues as other software components, what may give advantage to competitors who target the actual platform instead of the challenges. While it is arguable that successful attacks against the platform demonstrate relevant skills, the organizers may be interested into enforcing rules and rewarding solutions of the contest problems, due to sponsorship duties or focused recruiting efforts. To mitigate this, we present NIZKCTF, the first open-audit CTF platform based on non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs. NIZKCTF is publicly available for anyone who wants to run a CTF competition and provides strong transparency guarantees through the protocol, allowing any entity to verify the contest progression and outcome by employing a Git-based transaction log, a continuous integration service and zero-knowledge proofs. Using NIZKCTF, we conducted a competition for 10 invited teams. This competition had a bug bounty program, with cash prizes for teams able to exploit and compromise the CTF result. In this experiment, we observed that attacks carried by the teams against the platform were unsuccessful.
INTRODUCTION
A critical element of a robust cybersecurity strategy is having trained people in recent technological security issues.
Research shows that the United States is the most prepared country against cyber attacks [1] , however, there is also a problem of quantity and quality of professionals, especially when it comes to more sophisticated skills such as security by design, defensive programming, applied cryptography, threat intelligence and forensic analysis after a compromise [10] .
In order to reduce the shortage of cybersecurity professionals, companies, schools, universities and military institutions have been promoting Capture the Flag (CTF) competitions around the world to foster the engagement of professionals in cybersecurity topics. CTF competitions are usually designed to serve an educational purpose to give participants experience with computer security problems from a wide spectrum of technical areas, as well as conducting Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for third-party components of this work must be honored. For all other uses, contact the owner/author(s). Fig. 1 . In the RC3 CTF 2016, hackers exploited the scoreboard to report the vulnerability to the competition administrators.
sure a user can replicate the solution idea. APG also allows competition administrators to detect when users submit a copied flag from another user to the scoring server.
There are works regarding problems that may affect the overall quality of CTFs [6, 8, 9] . Chung et al. [8] present insights and lessons learned from organizing CSAW, one of the largest and most successful CTFs. Chapman et al. [6] present the competition design of PicoCTF, as well as an evaluation based on survey responses and website interaction statistics, and insights into the students who played. Despite the relevance, these works do not address solutions for the security problem of players attacking the CTF platform.
PROBLEM STATEMENT
Unfortunately, it is common to find vulnerabilities in CTF platforms. Here we present just two examples. RC3 CTF 2016: For a moment during this CTF, the first place team had 3590 points. Suddenly, a team named "The board is vulnerable, please contact admin@seadog007.me" appeared in the scoreboard with 4500 points [19] . Figure   1 shows the record of this fact. Fortunately, the intention of the hackers who exploited the platform was just to report the vulnerability to the administrators. However, it was perfectly possible to exploit it for malicious purposes.
CODEGATE CTF 2016 Finals: During this CTF, a team discovered that the server hosting one of the challenges had an old kernel version and was vulnerable to overlayfs privilege escalation (CVE-2016-1576) [13] . The team members were able to gain root access and get some "free flags" (although they claim that they did not submit these flags until they really solved the challenges). Tracing the system calls of the SSH server, they waited for an administrator to log in and were able to get their password. Then, the team noticed that other servers (including the scoreboard) had the same password. After visiting the platform servers and having fun, they stopped the intrusion and proceeded to play as usual [12] .
The aforementioned cases illustrate the impact of software vulnerabilities in CTF platforms and justify the ever growing importance of securing them. This paper addresses this problem and intends to answer the following questions:
(i) how to guarantee integrity and a minimum level of fairness in a CTF competition, preventing teams from stealing flags by exploiting the platform? (ii) how to ensure auditability, allowing anyone to verify whether teams really solved the challenges according to the points presented in the scoreboard? Our proposed solution is discussed next.
COMPETITION PROTOCOL
This section describes the novel competition protocol employed by NIZKCTF. A threat model for CTF competitions is defined, followed by a formalization of the main theoretical tools and requirements for auditability.
Threat Model
In a CTF competition, the adversary is a player or team interested in exploiting vulnerabilities in the platform, instead of solving challenges, to obtain advantages such as stealing flags or manipulating the scoreboard. Due the difficulty in developing a vulnerability-free system, NIZKCTF relies on cryptographic primitives to provide security properties, such as zero-knowledge proofs.
Another form of adversarial behavior is a team who wants to submit flags in place of another team without their consent (e.g., to harm a specific team by making it fall behind on the scoreboard). For this reason, NIZKCTF makes a zero-knowledge proof to be unique to a particular team.
The protocol alone does not protect against flag sharing, i.e., teams copying and submitting flags from others. For a solution that address this type of adversary, recall the automatic problem generation proposed by Burket et al. [5] .
Since in a competition based on NIZKCTF it is possible to have automatic problem generation, our proposal can be extended to support protection against a flag sharing adversary.
Zero-knowledge Proof of Knowledge
Let L be a NP language such that pk i ∈ L iff there exists a witness sk i yielding M L (pk i , sk i ) = 1, where M L is a polynomial-time Turing machine. Let us also assume that the probability of computing sk i from pk i in polynomial time is negligible.
A non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proof of knowledge [3] is a cryptographic scheme through which a prover knowing sk i can convince a verifier of that fact, satisfying the following properties:
Non-interactivity: Access to a public set of common parameters and to the contents of the proof itself must be sufficient to verify a proof. Since no interaction with the prover is required, any party interested in acting as a verifier may do so.
Completeness: If pk i ∈ L the proof generated by an honest prover knowing sk i must be accepted by an honest verifier:
Validity: Any probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) prover who does not know sk i must have negligible probability of success ϵ in convincing a verifier. Equivalently, for every possible PPT prover P (even malicious ones) there exists a knowledge extractor Extract that, given oracle access to P, is able to extract sk i with overwhelming probability 1 − ϵ every time P succeeds in completing a new proof:
where Q denotes a query tape which registers all previous queries that have been sent to a prover.
Zero-knowledge:
The proof discloses no information about sk i besides the fact that the prover knows its value.
Equivalently, for every possible PPT verifier V (even malicious ones) there exists a simulator Sim that, given oracle access to V, is able to convince V with a negligible difference in probability ϵ when compared to an honest Manuscript submitted to ACM NIZKCTF: A Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Capture the Flag Platform 5 prover, even though Sim has no knowledge of sk i :
In NIZKCTF, values of pk i are publicly disclosed, but the corresponding sk i which allows proving pk i ∈ L is kept secret. Every player holds a witness sk t attesting membership to their team t. When a player solves a challenge c of the competition, they obtain a witness sk c asserting they hold the answer to the challenge. In order to earn points for their team, the player needs to publicly prove simultaneous knowledge of sk t and sk c . The concept of simultaneous knowledge is formalized by performing proofs on an auxiliary NP language L ′ such that pk t ∥pk c ∈ L ′ iff there exists
where the operator ∥ denotes string concatenation.
Different approaches exist for proving knowledge of witness sk t ∥sk c , but their practicality depends on the exact choice of M L and, consequently, of M L ′ . Next, we discuss such approaches.
A generic approach.
The first approach consists in using a general-purpose non-interactive zero-knowledge
then M L ′ could be implemented as an arithmetic circuit similar to the one adopted by the Zerocash protocol, so that proofs could be carried out using zk-SNARKs [16] . Generality, however, comes with a price: although zk-SNARKs are succinct and can be verified efficiently, players would still need to download a proving key of hundreds of MBs and consume tens of seconds of processing time to construct a proof.
4.2.2
A scheme based on digital signatures. The second approach, proposed and implemented in NIZKCTF, consists in choosing a M L (pk i , sk i ) which verifies whether sk i is the private key corresponding to the public key pk i in a digital signature scheme. This choice allows us to reduce our proof of knowledge problem to that of digitally signing messages, whose implementation is simpler and more efficient than any known general-purpose NIZK proof system.
The Schnorr signature scheme and its key-prefixed variant over elliptic curves EdDSA [4] satisfy completeness, validity and zero-knowledge properties under the assumption that the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) is hard [11, 15] .
However, incorrectly composing two signatures when constructing a proof of simultaneous knowledge may undermine the validity of such properties.
Let the following be the primitives of a secure digital signature scheme:
Signs the message m using the private key sk i . Outputs the message m prepended to the signature s.
⊥, otherwise Verifies whether s is a valid signature for m produced by the private key sk i corresponding to the public key pk i .
Outputs the original message m if the signature is valid, or ⊥ if it is invalid.
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We propose the following scheme to prove knowledge of the witness sk t ∥sk c corresponding to pk t ∥pk c ∈ L ′ :
Prove(pk t ∥pk c , sk t ∥sk c ) = Sign(sk c , Sign(sk t , c)) (1)
where m = Open(pk t , Open(pk c , σ )).
(2)
We argue Eqs. 1 and 2 satisfy the properties of a NIZK proof of knowledge scheme:
Non-interactivity: Since pk t , pk c and the digital signature scheme parameters are public and known to all parties, the proof σ can be verified by Eq. 2 without interaction with the prover.
Completeness: Since Open(pk i , Sign(sk i , m)) = m for all i and for all m such that M L (pk i , sk i ) = 1, by simply substituting into Eqs. 1 and 2:
Verify(pk t ∥pk c , Prove(pk t ∥pk c , sk t ∥sk c )) = 1.
Validity: If the digital signature scheme satisfies validity of the signed message s ∥m, there exists a knowledge extractor Extract(pk i , s ∥m) able to extract sk i from the Sign(sk i , m) operation implemented by any (possibly malicious) PPT prover P. Therefore, a knowledge extractor Extract ′ able to extract sk t ∥sk c from P is constructed as follows:
Extract ′ (pk t ∥pk c , s c ∥s t ∥c) = Extract(pk t , s t ∥c) ∥ Extract(pk c , s c ∥s t ∥c).
Let Q be the query tape of Sign(sk i , m), and Q ′ be the query tape of Prove(pk t ∥pk c , sk t ∥sk c ). Extract ′ succeeds as long as: (sk t , c) Q:
Otherwise, P may replay s t ∥c from a previous run, causing Extract(pk t , s t ∥c) to fail in extracting sk t .
(sk c , s t ∥c) Q:
Otherwise, P may replay s c ∥s t ∥c from a previous run, causing Extract(pk c , s c ∥s t ∥c) to fail in extracting sk c .
However, since all messages signed by sk t reference c, (sk t , c) ∈ Q ⇐⇒ (pk t ∥pk c , sk t ∥sk c ) ∈ Q ′ . Similarly, since all messages signed by sk c reference t, (sk c , s t ∥c) ∈ Q ⇐⇒ (pk t ∥pk c , sk t ∥sk c ) ∈ Q ′ .
The definition of validity allows the knowledge extractor to fail when (pk t ∥pk c , sk t ∥sk c ) ∈ Q ′ , thus existence of Extract ′ proves that validity is satisfied.
Zero-knowledge: If the digital signature scheme satisfies zero-knowledge of the private key sk i , there exists a simulator Sim(pk i , m) able to convince the validity of the signed message s ∥m to the Open(pk i , s ∥m) operation implemented by any (possibly malicious) PPT verifier V. Therefore, there exists a simulator Sim ′ able to convince V of the proof validity:
Sim ′ (pk t ∥pk c ) = Sim(pk c , Sim(pk t , c)). In some CTFs, the flag f c for a challenge c consists of a random hexadecimal string large enough (e.g., 256 bits, after decoding) to make a brute-force attack unfeasible. In this case, the flag f c can be used directly as the seed for a deterministic digital signature key pair generator:
Many competitions, however, adopt password-like flags, such as "CTF-X{you_mastered_technique_Y}". In this case, a password-based key derivation function PBKDF can be used along with a public salt value φ c to increase the difficulty of an offline brute-force attack [18] :
In NIZKCTF, we use Eq. 3 as a conservative choice to support both types of flags.
Auditability
In order to allow CTFs to be openly audited and independently verified, it is necessary to have all operations carried in a database and the following requirements met:
History preservation: The database must be able to recover a snapshot of its state after each committed transaction and preserve the logical order of these transactions.
Immutability: Once a transaction is committed, the database must prevent it from being erased. If an application needs to revert data to a previous state, the only way to perform that operation must be by performing a new transaction.
Replication: Anyone interested in auditing the competition must be able to retrieve and replicate the entire contents and transaction history of the database.
IMPLEMENTATION
Different instances of NIZKCTF can be constructed by choosing distinct underlying technologies. We selected components for implementing NIZKCTF with the goal of maximizing the usage of free-of-charge hosted services like GitHub (or GitLab) and Amazon cloud services which provide a permanent free tier (AWS Lambda and SNS).
Our implementation 1 is composed by the following modules: a distributed storage for sharing data (implemented by a Git repository), a continuous integration script for accepting submissions (implemented by an AWS Lambda function), a command-line interface for interacting with the platform, and a web interface for displaying the list of challenges and the scoreboard.
As can be seen in Figure 2 , the distributed storage is used for propagating the necessary data while keeping the full change history. Players then interact with the distributed storage by using the command-line interface, which implements the NIZKCTF protocol. A request to merge the new data with the main repository is created and later evaluated by the Lambda Function. The Lambda Function checks the validity of the modifications, then decides to accept or deny the request. After the changes are merged, the web interface starts using the most recent version of the data.
The distributed storage allows the replication of challenges, team registrations, proofs and other CTF metadata while ensuring that the entire change history is preserved. In our implementation, this property is achieved by adopting a Git repository as the database. Git commits are stored as a Directed Acyclic Graph that can be later queried [14] . This allows any participant to audit all changes made, including ordering and timestamps.
When changes are made to the player's local storage, a pull request is created to merge the modifications with the central Git repository managed by the competition's staff. The pull request is evaluated by the Lambda Function and, if accepted, all changed data is incorporated and can be propagated to other teams.
In order to avoid tampering with commit history, the repository is configured to disallow force pushes. Without force pushes, changes committed to the central repository must always descent from the central repository history. In other words, pushed commits are not allowed to modify the commit chain, guaranteeing immutability of previously committed changes.
The Lambda Function works like a continuous integration service. It is triggered by a GitHub hook to automatically accept pull requests containing team registrations and proof submissions. However, since the Lambda Function does not have access to any privileged information about the challenges, any node with access to the distributed storage can also be used for verifying submissions.
The command-line interface is a Python script used for automating modifications on the distributed storage and uses libsodium for all cryptography implementations. Currently, the following operations are supported:
Login: Connects to GitHub or GitLab, generates an API token and creates a fork of the CTF's main repository.
Register: Registers a new team and creates a pull request.
Challenges: Lists available challenges with their title, description, categories and rewards.
Submit: Checks if the challenge's private key can be successfully computed from the flag provided by the competitor, then generates a submission request of the zero-knowledge proof.
Score: Reads the accepted submissions file and presents the scoreboard.
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The web interface uses the repository as a GitHub page which exposes files with an HTTP server. This allows the challenges and scoreboard to be viewed in a more user-friendly way. The interface is implemented using only client side programming languages (HTML, CSS and Javascript). Challenges and scoreboard files are loaded using Ajax in order to give a dynamic feel.
It is worth noting that the distributed storage could also be implemented using a blockchain like Ethereum [17] . This would allow a fully distributed implementation of NIZKCTF in which submission proofs are appended to the blockchain and validated by contest participants. In this paper this was not the chosen implementation because it would require a small transaction fee for each submitted proof.
VALIDATION
To validate our proposal, we conducted the Pwn2Win Platform Test Edition, a small CTF competition for 10 invited teams. The objective of this CTF was to assess the usefulness and security of NIZKCTF. In order to achieve that, we used the Goal, Question, Metric (GQM) paradigm [2] , a mechanism for defining and evaluating goals using measurement.
GQM defines a measurement model on three levels: conceptual level (Goal), operational level (Question) and quantitative level (Metric). GQM templates are a structured way of specifying goals and contains the following fields:
purpose, object of study, focus, stakeholder and context. Here is a GQM template to express the goal of our study: The purpose of this study is to evaluate the usefulness of NIZKCTF when being used by the participants in a CTF competition.
To characterize the measurement object, we defined the research question RQ1: Is our implementation of NIZKCTF able to provide the features (e.g., challenges, submissions and scoreboard) of a common CTF?
Pwn2Win Platform Test Edition had 7 challenges and duration of 12 hours. There were one challenge of exploitation, cryptography, web, networking and miscellaneous, and two of reverse engineering. Teams were able to solve the challenges and there was a scoreboard, just like a common CTF. Players also gave good feedbacks and no one had objections in using NIZKCTF in future CTFs. Therefore, we support a positive answer for RQ1.
From the 10 invited teams, 5 of them scored (solved at least one challenge). Since the CTF had many low-complexity challenges and the invited teams were very experienced (for example, one of the teams was the 2016 second place at ctftime.org), we assume that teams that did not score were focused in trying to exploit the platform, as we present next.
Here is another GQM template to express another goal of our study: The purpose of this study is to evaluate the security of NIZKCTF against attacks to the platform from the participants in a CTF competition.
To characterize the measurement object, we defined the research question RQ2: Is any participant able to attack the platform and compromise the CTF result?
To answer this question, we made a bug bounty program, with 450 BRL in cash prizes for teams who find vulnerabilities and compromise the result. During and after (we kept the platform online for 20 days) the CTF, teams were not able to do that. Therefore, we support a negative answer for RQ2.
CONCLUSIONS
With the growing interest in CTFs, there is a need for a secure and auditable platform. We presented a novel platform called NIZKCTF: Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Capture the Flag. Through theoretical cryptography constraints, we claim that a CTF running NIZKCTF is more secure than when running a traditional platform.
An implementation of NIZKCTF was tested in the Pwn2Win Platform Test Edition, and we also claim that it was the first CTF to use a zero-knowledge protocol for proving the challenges' resolution. It was a competition with a bug
